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Casenote

Caps Off to Juries: Noneconomic Damage
Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases Ruled
Unconstitutional

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2005 the Georgia General Assembly (General Assembly) passed a
controversial tort reform bill in an effort to reduce the cost of medical
liability insurance for health care providers.' In this bill, the legislature
put a cap of $350,000 on noneconomic damages (pain and suffering) for
medical malpractice cases.2 On March 22, 2010, the Georgia Supreme
Court in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, RC. v. Nestlehutt3 held these
caps unconstitutional on grounds that they violate the state constitutional right to jury trial.' By ruling on these grounds, the court was able
to avoid weighing in on the competing interests of the medical industry
and medical malpractice plaintiffs, which would have required an equal

1. Ga. S. Bill 3, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1 (codified in scattered sections of titles 9,
24, 33, 43, and 51 of the O.C.G.A.).
2. Id. § 13, 2005 Ga. Laws at 16-17.
3. 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218 (2010).
4. Id. at 731, 691 S.E.2d at 220.
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protection or due process analysis. The court, therefore, circumvented
the politics of tort reform by way of a right to jury trial analysis.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2005 Betty Nestlehutt became a patient of Atlanta Oculoplastic
Surgery, P.C. d/b/a Oculus (Oculus) and, in January 2006, underwent a
facelift and full face CO2 laser resurfacing, performed by Dr. Harvey P.
Cole III. The procedure unintentionally cut off blood flow to Mrs.
Nestlehutt's face, causing wounds to form from her temple to chin.6 As
a result of the surgery, Mrs. Nestlehutt became permanently disabled
and disfigured. In April 2007, Mrs. Nestlehutt and her husband filed a
medical malpractice action in Fulton County State Court against Oculus
and Dr. Cole, alleging damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering,
and loss of consortium.
After a mistrial, the case was re-tried in 2008, resulting in a jury
verdict of $1,265,000, consisting of $115,000 for medical expenses,
$250,000 for loss of consortium, and $900,000 in noneconomic damages
for pain and suffering." After the jury returned a verdict, the Nestlehutts moved the trial court to hold the Georgia statute placing caps on
noneconomic damages, section 51-13-1 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.), unconstitutional. 0 In February 2009 the trial
court granted the motion, finding O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 violated the right
to jury trial, the separation of powers doctrine, and equal protection, and
ruled the statute unconstitutional on all three grounds.u The trial
court subsequently entered judgment in the full amount awarded by the
jury: $1,265,000.12

5. Complaint for Damages at para. 6, Nestlehutt v. Atlanta Ocoluplastic Surgery, P.C.,
No. 2007EV002223J (Ga. State Ct. 2007), 2007 WL 5720583.
6. Bill Rankin, Georgia High Court Considers Tort Reform Law, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
Sept. 15, 2009, www.ajc.com/news/georgia-high-court-considers-139073.html.
7. Complaint for Damages, supra note 5, at paras. 1, 8, 13.
8. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 731, 691 S.E.2d 218,
220 (2010).
9. O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 (Supp. 2010).
10. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment on the Verdict and for
a Declaration of Unconstitutionality for O.C.G.A. § 15-13-1, Nestlehutt v. Atlanta
Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C., No. 2007ev002223j (Ga. State Ct. 2008), 2008 WL 4888267.
11. Order Declaring O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 Unconstitutional, Nestlehutt v. Atlanta
Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C., No. 2007EV002223-J (Ga. State Ct. 2009), 2009 WL 348361.
12. Id.
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In June 2009, after a motion for a new trial was denied, the defendant, Oculus, appealed." Numerous briefs were filed independently
and collaboratively in support of Oculus, including briefs by Emory
Healthcare;" the Georgia and American Hospital Associations;s the
Medical Association of Georgia, the American Medical Association, and
the American Tort Reform Association;16 and the Medical Association
of Georgia Mutual Insurance Company (MAG Mutual) and the Physician
Insurers Association of America." Mrs. Nestlehutt responded,s and
briefs were also filed in her support, including briefs by the AARP"
and briefs filed on behalf of individuals and former medical malpractice
20
plaintiffs.
On March 22, 2010, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's ruling that O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 was unconstitutional.2 ' The
court held that the caps, by limiting awards of noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases, violated the state constitutional right to a
jury trial.22 The court also held that the decision would apply retroac-

tively.2 3

13. Appellant's Brief at 3, Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218 (No. S09A1432),
2009 WL 2954781.
14. Brief of Emory Healthcare, Inc., as Amicus Curiae, Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 691
S.E.2d 218 (No. S09A1432), 2009 WL 2954780.
15. Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Georgia Hospital Ass'n and the American
Hospital Ass'n, Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218 (No. S09A1432), 2009 WL 6690445.
16. Amici Curiae Brief of the Medical Ass'n of Georgia et al., Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731,
691 S.E.2d 218 (No. S09A1432), 2009 WL 6690449.
17. Brief on Behalf of Amici Curiae MAG Mutual Insurance Co. and the Physician
Insurers Ass'n of America, Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218 (No. S09A1432), 2009
WL 6690452.
18. Brief of Appellees, Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218 (No. S09A1432), 2009
WL 2954779.
19. Brief Amici Curiae of AARP et al. in Support of Appellees, Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731,
691 S.E.2d 218 (No. S09A1432), 2009 WL 6690447.
20. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Hugh D. Broome, Jr. and Brenda Broome,
Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731,691 S.E.2d 218 (No. S09A1432), 2009 WL 6690450; Brief of Amicus
Curiae Jesse Outland et al. in Support of Appellees, Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d
218 (No. S09A1432), 2009 WL 6690455; Brief of Appellee Amicus Curiae Robin Frazer
Clark, Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218 (No. S09A1432), 2009 WL 6690456.
21. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 740, 691 S.E.2d at 226.
22. Id. at 731, 691 S.E.2d at 220.
23. Id. at 740, 691 S.E.2d at 226.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Effective February 16, 2005, the noneconomic damage caps set forth
in O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1(b) to (e)' were the result of a heated legislative
debate. Given the legislative history and frequency of constitutional
challenges to noneconomic damage caps nationwide, it was not surprising when the caps began to be challenged in Georgia.
Legislative History of O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1
The capping of noneconomic damages was a part of a larger tort
reform act passed by the General Assembly in 2005 in Senate Bill 3 (SB
3),25 also known as the Georgia Tort Reform Act of 2005.26 The
Georgia Tort Reform Act was purposed on a finding by the legislature
that a health care "crisis" exists in Georgia and that medical malpractice
actions have caused the crisis by creating increased difficulty and
expense for doctors and hospitals in obtaining liability insurance.27
The legislature found the difficulty in obtaining insurance caused a
decrease in the availability of health care services in Georgia.2 ' The

A.

24. O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1(b) to (e) (Supp. 2010). In pertinent part, the statute reads as
follows:
(b) In any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical malpractice action,
including an action for wrongful death, against one or more health care providers,
the total amount recoverable by a claimant for noneconomic damages in such
action shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $350,000.00, regardless of the
number of defendant health care providers against whom the claim is asserted or
the number of separate causes of action on which the claim is based.
(c) In any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical malpractice action,
including an action for wrongful death, against a single medical facility,.. . the
total amount recoverable by claimant for noneconomic damages in such action
shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $350,000.00 ....
(d) In any verdict returned or judgment entered in a medical malpractice action,
... the total amount recoverable by a claimant for noneconomic damages in such
action shall be limited to an amount not to exceed $350,000.00 from any single
medical facility and $700,000.00 from all medical facilities, regardless of the
number of defendant medical facilities against whom the claim is asserted or the
number of separate causes of action on which the claim is based.
(e) In applying subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this Code section, the aggregate
amount of noneconomic damages recoverable under such subsections shall in no
event exceed $1,050,000.00.
Id.
25. Ga. S. Bill 3, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1 (codified in scattered sections of titles 9,
24, 33, 43, and 51 of the O.C.G.A.).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 1, 2005 Ga. Laws at 1.
28. Id. § 1, 2005 Ga. Laws at 1-2.
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legislature posited that creating stricter limitations on medical
malpractice claims and awards would increase "predictability and
improvement in the provision of quality health care services and the
resolution of health care liability claims and [would] thereby assist in
promoting the provision of health care liability insurance by insurance
providers."2 9 One of the arguments made by the bill's sponsor, Senator
Preston Smith, was that MAG Mutual, Georgia's largest physician
insurer, agreed to continue to honor a 10% rollback of insurance
premiums if the bill were enacted."o
Capping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice lawsuits was
one controversial reform measure that the legislature adopted in SB
331 The history of the noneconomic damage caps in the Georgia Tort
Reform Act can be traced back to a failed tort reform effort in 2004:
House Bill 1028 (HB 1028). The failure of HB 1028 was largely due
to concern about an amendment capping noneconomic damages much
like the provision at issue. The amendment was initially rejected by
the Georgia Senate but later resurfaced in conference committee,
creating an impasse in negotiations and ultimately causing the entire
tort reform bill to fail. Many senators believed that the noneconomic
damages cap was introduced in the amendment by those opposed to tort
reform because it was a "poison-pill," unlikely to pass at all. Other
senators believed that MAG Mutual pushed "unrealistically" for the
damage caps.
Tort reform efforts continued in 2005, and noneconomic damage caps
In response to the failure of HB 1028, Senator
returned in SB 3.
Smith encouraged engrossing the 2005 bill because it was "not well
perfected on the floor of the Senate" in 2004. The engrossment of SB

29. Id. § 1, 2005 Ga. Laws at 2.
30. Hannah Yi Crockett et al., Torts and Civil Practice,22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 221, 237
(2005). MAG Mutual is also an advocate for tort reform. See Brief on Behalf of Amici
Curiae MAG Mutual Insurance Co. and the Physician Insurers Ass'n of America, supra
note 17, at 1-2.
31. Ga. S. Bill 3 § 13, 2005 Ga. Laws at 16-17.
32. Ga. H.R. Bill 1028, Reg. Sess. (2004) (unenacted).
33. David Boohaker et al., Health, Torts, and Civil Practice,21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 178,
179, 193 (2004). Amendment 23C of H.R. Bill 1028 proposed a limit of $250,000 in
noneconomic damages towards a single defendant and a limit of $750,000 for multiple
defendants. Id. at 193.

34. Id. at 193-94.
35. Id. at 184-85 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. at 194-95.
37. Ga. S. Bill 3 § 13, 2005 Ga. Laws at 16-17.
38. Hannah Yi Crockett et al., supra note 30, at 231 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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3 ensured that the bill-and the noneconomic damage caps therein-would
not be debated and amended in conference committee.3" Georgia
senators voted, 29 to 25, to engross the bill and passed it on a vote of 38
to 15.40 The Senate's willingness to pass tort reform in 2005, as
opposed to 2004, may be attributed to the November 2004 elections,
which changed the makeup of the legislature. 1 Ultimately, SB 3 was
passed by both houses and signed into law on February 16, 2005.
B. Challenges to the Constitutionalityof Noneconomic Damage Caps
in Georgia
After the caps were in place, medical malpractice plaintiffs began
challenging the constitutionality of the caps in Georgia courts. In April
2008, in Park v. Wellstar Health System, Inc.,a the Fulton County
Superior Court issued a declaratory judgment holding that the noneconoIn
mic damage caps in O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1" were unconstitutional.
Park the plaintiff fell off a ladder and was taken to the emergency room,
had surgery, and was rendered a paraplegic. The plaintiff filed a
medical malpractice suit against the defendants and filed a motion for
declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of SB 3.46
The court found that the damage caps violated the equal protection
requirement in the Georgia State Constitution4 ' by making a distinction between tortfeasors generally and medical malpractice defendants
in particular.4' The court further found that the cap applied "to the
heart of the substance of an injured person's tort claim," which is
directly tied to a party's right to jury trial, distinguishing the cap from
other tort reform efforts that applied to procedural issues. 49 The court
reasoned that "the jury's verdict will be written down by operation of the
caps whenever the jury concludes that the actual pain and suffering was

39. Id.
40. Id. at 231, 233.
41. CompareGeorgia General Assembly Voting Records, Senate Voting Record HB 1028
(adoption of Amendment 23(c)), availableat http://www.legis.state.ga.udlegis/2003-04/votes/svl095.htm, with Georgia General Assembly Voting Records, Senate Voting Record SB
3, available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/votes/sv0023.htm.
42. Ga. S. Bill 3 § 16, 2005 Ga. Laws at 18.
43. No. 2007CV135208, 2008 WL 2068203 (Ga. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2008).
44. O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 (Supp. 2010).
45. Park, 2008 WL 2068203.
46. Id.
47. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2; GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 4.
48. Park, 2008 WL 2068203.
49. Id.
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greater [and] [tlo that extent, the jury's award is a meaningless
exercise"; therefore, the caps interfered with the jury's role."o
Rather than deciding the caps violated the right to jury trial, which
the court conceded would be enough to render the caps unconstitutional,
the court used the jury trial right as a basis for its equal protection
analysis, holding the jury's authority to award the amount of damages
to be a fundamental right." In applying a mid-level scrutiny test, the
court determined there was not a substantial relationship between the
classification of noneconomic damage caps" and the legislative objective to remedy the health care crisis." The court was not convinced
that noneconomic damages had to be limited "to allow the medical
profession to function effectively.""
Although the court, in dicta, addressed the caps' infringement on a
jury's determination," the right to jury trial was not addressed in Park.
Further, after this order was entered, the parties in Park settled, and
the 2008 ruling of the Fulton County Superior Court was never
appealed."
Therefore, in Nestlehutt,57 the constitutionality of
noneconomic damage caps was an issue of first impression for the
Georgia Supreme Court."

50. Id.

51. Id.
52. The court held that the caps had the effect of treating rich and poor plaintiffs
differently and treating those who were seriously injured versus those who were
moderately injured differently as well. Id. First, by only capping noneconomic damages,
the wealthy would continue to be able recover a large amount of money based in economic
damages due to their high projected future incomes. Id. Meanwhile, the poor and middle
class would be able to recover only a very limited amount of money due to their low future
projected earnings, resulting in low economic damages and would be limited by the caps
in noneconomic damages as well. Id. Second, the court held that the caps were unconstitutional in treating persons with different degrees of injury differently by fully compensating
persons with noneconomic injuries under $350,000 and limiting noneconomic recovery to
persons who suffer the most with noneconomic injuries greater than $350,000. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Statutory Ceiling on Damages in Medical MalpracticeActions is Unconstitutional (Georgia

2009),

MED.

LIABILTY

REP.,

http://www.medical-liability-reporter

.com/MLRDamages.2.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2011); Tort Reform Challenge-Parkv.
Wellstar et al. MAG Mutual's Official Statement, MAG MUTUAL, http-//www.magmutual.
com/pr marketing/MM-TortReform-Statement.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2011).
57. 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218 (2010).
58. Id. at 738-39, 691 S.E.2d at 225.
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C. Challenges to Constitutionalityof Noneconomic Damage Caps in
Other States
The constitutionality of noneconomic damage caps has been addressed
by courts in other states with mixed results. In states with constitutions
that have similar inviolate-right-to-jury-trial language, the issue of
whether damage caps unconstitutionally violate this right has created
an ideological split about the scope of the jury trial right. Challenges to
caps have generally resulted in two types of rulings: courts have found
that either (1) the caps infringe on an inviolate right to jury trial by
interfering with the jury's fact-finding role in determining damages (by
potentially altering what the jury found was proper) 9 or (2) the caps
do not infringe on any right to jury trial, as they are applied as a matter
of law after the jury has reached its verdict.60 Courts on both sides are
highly persuaded by opinions in other states and cite them often.
In the last twenty years, beginning with the Washington Supreme
Court in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.62 and later refined by the Oregon
Supreme Court in Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc.,63 states taking the
position that caps violate the right to jury trial have developed an
historical methodology with increasing depth. This method involves
four components, beginning with an analysis of the state's constitutional
provision regarding the inviolate right to jury trial, construed as a
guarantee immune from modification."
Second, courts make an
historical inquiry into the causes of action for which a right to jury trial
existed at the time of the adoption of their state constitutions, finding
that a right to jury trial existed for medical malpractice claims.66

59. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 162 (Ala. 1991); Lakin
v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 472-73 (Or. 1999); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d
711, 720 (Wash. 1989).
60. See, e.g., Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1120 (Idaho 2000);
Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 116-17 (Md. 1992); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880
N.E.2d 420, 431 (Ohio 2007).
61. See, e.g., Sofie, 771 P.2d at 723 (noting similar "inviolate" language in the other
states' constitutions that was "highly persuasive").
62. 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
63. 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999).
64. See generally Lakin, 987 P.2d 463; Sofie, 771 P.2d 711. But cf Moore, 592 So. 2d
156 (departing from an in-depth historical analysis but reaching the same conclusion,
holding caps on noneconomic damages unconstitutional in violation of the right to jury
trial).
65. Lakin, 987 P.2d at 467-68; Sofie, 771 P.2d at 716.
66. Lakin, 987 P.2d at 468-70 (examining the history of the guarantee of trial by jury
beginning with the Magna Carta, starting with English common law by using Blackstone's
commentaries and early American state constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right
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Third, courts determine the scope of the jury's role, which includes the
finding of damages as an issue of fact.67 This determination of damages includes noneconomic damages.6 8 Fourth, these courts reason that,
although the caps are in effect after the jury verdict is issued, the effect
of the caps interferes with the function of the jury and is therefore
unconstitutional.69
Further, courts holding the caps unconstitutional explain their position
by distinguishing remittitur, the process allowing a judge to reduce a
damage award in cases of excess, from damage caps.o The courts
reason that judicial remittitur is "fundamentally different" from caps
because remittitur is a legal finding that the jury's damage amount is
unsupported by the evidence, made on a case-by-case basis, with a
constitutional presumption in favor of the jury, and with the plaintiff
having the option of accepting the reduction or having a new trial."
Courts reason that caps, on the other hand, are mandatory, leaving the
plaintiff with no option for a new trial and leaving no room for judicial
discretion." These courts also argue that the state legislatures have
the ability to modify laws but are always limited by state constitutions."
This methodology is also mirrored by states that uphold caps as
constitutional, to a point. States upholding the caps (1) consult their
constitutions, (2) find that the right to a jury trial applies only for
actions existing at the time of adoption of their constitutions, (3) concede
that medical malpractice actions are in the class of actions guaranteeing
a right to jury trial, and (4) hold that the jury's fact-finding function
includes the determination of all damages.14 These courts, however,
define the function and role of the jury differently. They hold that
modification of a jury verdict through statutory caps does not infringe on
the jury's role because the legislature has power to modify causes of

to jury trial); Sofie, 771 P.2d at 718.
67. Lakin, 987 P.2d at 470; Sofie, 771 P.2d at 716-17 (quoting James v. Robeck, 490
P.2d 878, 881 (Wash. 1971)).
68. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 717.
69. Id. at 721.
70. Lakin, 987 P.2d at 471; Sofie, 771 P.2d at 720-21.
71. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 721.
72. Lakin, 987 P.2d at 472.
73. Id. at 473; Sofie, 771 P.2d at 719.
74. See generally Kirkland,4 P.3d 1115; Murphy, 601 A.2d 102;Arbino, 880 N.E.2d 420.
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action" and applying the caps is a matter of law after the jury has
reached its verdict.
Whether damage caps unconstitutionally violate the right to jury trial
has created a split amongst courts regarding the power ofjuries. In this
area of law, state courts are strongly persuaded by decisions of other
states, adopting similar methodology and reasoning nationwide on both
sides. The approach to right-to-jury-trial challenges, with respect to
noneconomic damage caps, has developed in the last twenty years and
provides a basis for the Georgia Supreme Court's analysis in Nestlehutt.7
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
In Nestlehutt" Chief Justice Hunstein of the Georgia Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1,'9 which set forth
noneconomic damage caps for medical malpractice awards.o
A. A Unanimous Majority: Noneconomic Damage Caps Unconstitutional
The court held that noneconomic damage caps are unconstitutional, in
violation of the right to jury trial guaranteed by the Georgia State
Constitution," and did not address the separation of powers or equal
protection challenges.82 Chief Justice Hunstein conducted the right to
jury trial analysis using the same historic methodology set forth by
Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc.,' making four key points: (1) the Georgia
Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial; (2) medical malpractice
cases are of the class of cases for which a jury trial was guaranteed; (3)
the right to jury trial includes the jury's responsibility to determine

75. Murphy, 601 A.2d at 116 (holding that the caps do not infringe on the jury's role
because they are a matter of law, not fact, and that the legislature simply "abrogat[ed] or
modiflied] a cause of action" by putting the caps in place).
76. Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1120 (holding that juries have the duty to assess damages but
cannot "dictate through an award the legal consequences of" the verdict); Arbino, 880 N.E.
2d at 431 (holding that modifications to verdicts after the fact-finding process do not
intrude upon the findings of the jury because caps are applied as a matter of law outside
of the jury's function and reasoning that remittitur and double/treble damage awards are
examples of the court's willingness to apply law and change a jury's verdict).
77. See 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218.
78. 286 Ga. 731, 691 S.E.2d 218 (2010).
79. O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 (Supp. 2010).
80. Id. § 51-13-1(b) to (e).
81. GA. CONST. art I, § 1, para. 11(a).
82. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 738, 691 S.E.2d at 224.
83. 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999).
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damages, including both economic and noneconomic damages; and (4) by
requiring the court to reduce a noneconomic damages award, O.C.G.A.
§ 51-13-1 interferes with the jury's role and therefore violates the right
to jury trial." The court then addressed and rejected the appellant's
arguments by distinguishing noneconomic damages from other types of
damages and by distinguishing remittitur from damage caps." The
court concluded by holding that its decision applies retroactivly.'
Chief Justice Hunstein began by turning to the jury trial provision in
the Georgia Constitution that states, 'The right to trial by jury shall
remain inviolate." 7 The court explained that this right is guaranteed
"only with respect to cases as to which there existed a right to jury trial
at common law or by statute at the time of the adoption of the Georgia
Constitution in 1798."'s The court, per Lakin, examined the common
law of England prior to 1798 and relied on Blackstone, "whose commentaries constituted the law of [Georgia], before and since the Revolution,"
noting that medical malpractice claims existed in England in the
eighteenth century." The court noted that medical malpractice actions
existed in early American common law and also pointed out that medical
malpractice claims were some of the first types of cases reported in
Georgia case law."o Based on this historical analysis, the court held
that medical malpractice claims existed when the Georgia Constitution
was adopted in 1798; therefore, a right to jury trial was guaranteed."
Chief Justice Hunstein then examined the scope of the right to jury
trial and considered it well established that damages are an issue of fact
for the jury to determine." After holding that damages fall within the
scope of the right to jury trial guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution,
the Georgia Supreme Court held that noneconomic damages in
particular are within this scope as well, as an element of total damages.93 The court concluded that, because the right to jury trial for
medical malpractice claims existed at the adoption of the Georgia

84. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 733-36, 691 S.E.2d at 221-23.
85. Id. at 736-38, 691 S.E.2d at 223-24.
86. Id. at 740, 691 S.E.2d at 226.
87. Id. at 733, 691 S.E.2d at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also GA.
CONsT. art. I, § 1, para. 11(a).
88. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 733, 691 S.E.2d at 221 (quoting Benton v. Ga. Marble Co.,
258 Ga. 58, 66, 365 S.E.2d 413, 420 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 733-34, 691 S.E.2d at 221-22 (quoting Rouse v. State, 4 Ga. 136, 145 (1848)).
90. Id. at 734, 691 S.E.2d at 222.
91. Id. at 735, 691 S.E.2d at 223.
92. Id. at 734, 691 S.E.2d at 222 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 480 (1935)).
93. Id. at 735, 691 S.E.2d at 222.
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Constitution, this right included the determination of all damages,
including noneconomic damages."
Once the court established that there is a right to jury trial in medical
malpractice claims, the court held that noneconomic damage caps
infringed on the inviolate right to jury trial pursuant to the analysis in
other states." The court expressly held that "caps, in any amount,
[are] violative of the right to trial by jury"" and O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 is
unconstitutional.97
Chief Justice Hunstein then addressed and systematically rejected the
First, the court distinguished
appellant's arguments on appeal."
noneconomic damages from punitive damages, caps on which the court
has upheld as constitutional." Punitive damages, the court reasoned,
are not within the scope of the right to jury trial because they are
generally not part of fact finding.o Instead, punitive damages are
purposed to punish or deter a defendant, not to compensate a plaintiff 'o' Thus, caps on punitive damages do not interfere with the jury
trial right.'0 2 The court also noted that the cases involving punitive
damages, relied on by the appellant, were not resolved on grounds of
right to jury trial, but rather on equal protection or due process
grounds.103
Second, Chief Justice Hunstein opined that the legislature has the
ability to modify common law and "define, limit, and modify available
legal remedies," but the legislature cannot do so by infringing on the
right to jury trial in existing causes of action for which jury trials are
guaranteed."0 The court reasoned that, if the legislature wants to get
rid of medical malpractice claims, they must do so openly by abrogating
the entire claim, not by limiting a constitutional right tied to the
claim.0 5 Further, while the legislature may create statutes increasing
damages found by a jury via double or treble damages, these increases

94. Id. at 735, 691 S.E.2d at 223.
95. Id. at 735-36, 691 S.E.2d at 223.
96. Id. at 736, 691 S.E.2d at 223.
97. Id. at 738, 691 S.E.2d at 224.
98. Id. at 736-38, 691 S.E.2d at 223-24.
99. Id. at 736, 691 S.E.2d at 223 (citing State v. Moseley, 263 Ga. 680, 436 S.E.2d 632
(1993); Teasley v. Mathis, 243 Ga. 561, 255 S.E.2d 57 (1979)).
100. Id.
101. See id. (quoting Cooper Indus. Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
437 (2001)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 737, 691 S.E.2d at 224.
105. Id. at 736, 691 S.E.2d at 223.
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are unlikely to attach in cases in which the right to jury trial is
guaranteed, and, even if they did, these increases do not limit the jury's
findings, but "affirm the integrity" of those findings.' 0 6
Chief Justice Hunstein also distinguished caps on noneconomic
damages from judicial remittitur, which allows a judge to reduce an
excesive damage award under the judge's constitutional authority to
grant new trials.xo' The court reasoned that judicial remittitur is
"carefully circumscribed" and is applied only when the damages are so
"excessive as to any party as to be inconsistent with the preponderance
of the evidence."o Further, remittitur is not automatically triggered
if the judge finds the award to be excessive because the plaintiff has a
choice to agree to the new award or have a new trial.'
Finally, the court addressed the holdings of other jurisdictions raised
by the appellant that have found noneconomic damage caps constitutional."10 The court found contrary holdings in other jurisdictions to be
unpersuasive either because the language in the other states' constitutions is different from the "inviolate" language in the Georgia Constitution"' or because the reasoning set forth by those courts was unpersuasive generally." 2
B.

Retroactivity
After holding the O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 noneconomic damage caps
unconstitutional, the court ruled that this holding applies retroactively. "' Generally, when a statute is held unconstitutional the ruling
applies retroactively."' To determine if there was reason to deviate
from the default rule of retroactivity, the court applied the three-part
test adopted in City of Atlanta v. Barnes" by the Georgia Supreme
Court."16
The test is comprised of the following factors:

106. Id. at 737, 691 S.E.2d at 224.
107. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-12-12(b) (2009).
108. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 737-38, 691 S.E.2d at 224 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also O.C.G.A. § 51-12-12(b).
109. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 737, 691 S.E.2d at 224.
110. See id. at 738 n.8, 691 S.E.2d at 224 n.8.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 740, 691 S.E.2d at 226.
114. See id. at 738, 691 S.E.2d at 225 (quoting City of Atlanta v. Barnes, 276 Ga. 449,
452, 578 S.E.2d 110, 114 (2003)).
115. 276 Ga. 449, 578 S.E.2d 110 (2003).
116. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 738,691 S.E.2d at 225; see also Barnes, 276 Ga. at 452, 578
S.E.2d at 114.
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(1)whether the decision in question established a new principle of law
either by overruling past precedent or deciding an issue of first
impression, the resolution of which was not clearly foreshadowed; (2)
whether retroactive application would further or retard the operation
of the rule in question; and (3) whether retroactive application would
result in substantial inequitable results."
In applying the test, the court held that it was not unexpected that the
caps would be struck down because they had been in place for only five
years and the constitutionality of noneconomic damage caps had been
litigated nationwide."s Second, the court determined that the retroactive application of the decision would further the holding that the right
to jury trial includes the right to uncapped noneconomic damages.' 19
Third, the court held that the result of retroactive application would not
cause substantially inequitable results because there was no proof that
appellant's litigation strategy would have been different had it known
the caps were invalid.120 Lastly, the court noted that this decision did
not entitle the appellant to a new trial because the trial court did not
err: the trial court correctly ruled that the statute was unconstitutional.121
C.

Concurrence:Retroactivity Application
Justice Nahmias, joined by Presiding Justice Carley and Justice
Hines, specially concurred.12 2 While Justice Nahmias agreed that
retroactive application is proper, he disagreed with the court's use of the
three-part test. 2 1 Instead, Justice Nahmias argued that the Supreme
Court of the United States, which had originally devised the three-part
test in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson," had abandoned the Chevron test
in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxationl25 in 1993.126 Justice
Nahmias reasoned that Georgia has generally followed federal law in the
area of retroactivity and should continue to do so by avoiding the threepart test. 1 27 Justice Nahmias argued the court wrongly disregarded

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 738, 691 S.E.2d at 225.
Id. at 738-39, 691 S.E.2d at 225.
Id. at 739, 691 S.E.2d at 225.
Id.
Id. at 740 n.10, 691 S.E.2d at 226 n.10.
Id. at 740, 691 S.E.2d at 226 (Nahmias, J., concurring).
Id. at 741, 691 S.E.2d at 226.
404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).
509 U.S. 86 (1993).
Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 741, 691 S.E.2d at 226 (Nahmias, J., concurring).
See id. at 742, 691 S.E.2d at 227.
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the principles of Harper by unanimously endorsing the Chevron test
again in Findley v. Findleyl28 in 2006, arguing that once a law is
unconstitutional, that law is forbidden by the constitution, not by the
court via the Chevron test.129
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The Georgia Supreme Court ruling that noneconomic damage caps are
has practical implications for Georgians and
unconstitutional'
citizens of other states nationwide. This decision also has implications
for proponents of tort reform in Georgia, making it difficult, if not
impossible, for noneconomic caps to return in any form via the General
Assembly.
PracticalImplications for Georgians
At its most basic level, the removal of noneconomic damage caps
means that medical malpractice plaintiffs can recover more money for
noneconomic losses, should the jury so find. This will have a direct
impact on medical malpractice plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys.
Medical malpractice cases are expensive to try for plaintiffs because, in
addition to their complex nature, plaintiffs' attorneys must conduct
extensive medical research, go through a lengthy discovery process, and
If the case proceeds to trial, the
consult with medical professionals.'
plaintiff must produce expert testimony for the courta 2 with an
additional hearing prior to trial regarding the expert's qualifications.'
These stringent expert requirements have been set forth by law as
For these reasons, and because
another component of tort reform.'
most plaintiffs' attorneys work on a contingency fee basis, plaintiffs'
expenses often meet or exceed five figures, and only cases that could
135
yield major damages justify the expense.

A.

128. 280 Ga. 454, 629 S.E.2d 222 (2006).
129.
130.

Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 742-43, 691 S.E.2d at 227-28 (Nahmias, J., concurring).
Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 738, 691 S.E.2d 218,

224 (2010).
131. RICHARD E. SHANDELL ET AL., THE PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CASES § 2.02 (2010), available at 2003 WL 23519014.
132. See CHARLES R. ADAMs III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 5-1. 1(aXl), at 215 (2010-2011
ed. 2010).
133. See id. § 5-1.1(bX1), at 218.
134. See id. § 5-1.1(bX2), at 219.
135. SHANDELL ET AL., supra note 131, § 2.02 (stating "[njo case without significant
permanent injury can possibly support the work necessarily involved in the successful
prosecution of a medical malpractice claim").
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The 2005 caps on noneconomic damages created a further disincentive
for plaintiffs' attorneys to take on medical malpractice cases. This was
particularly true for complex cases that would have been more expensive
to try, even if the negligence involved was egregious and would likely
have resulted in a large award. Now that the caps have been lifted, the
cost-benefit analysis has changed, and plaintiffs' attorneys may now be
willing to shoulder more expenses up front, knowing that the ultimate
judgment could justify the expense. As the Fulton County Superior
Court predicted in Park v. Wellstar Health System, Inc.136 in 2008,
lifting the caps will allow greater access to the courts for those who are
the most seriously injured and for those whose damages are mostly
noneconomic, generally the poor and middle class.13 ' Also, although
the number of medical malpractice suits may increase as a result of this
ruling, there is no evidence or indication that this will cause an increase
in frivolous lawsuits. Plaintiffs' attorneys will remain reluctant to take
on medical malpractice cases that are frivolous or have little chance of
succeeding because out-of-pocket expenses can already be so high, with
or without caps.
The impact of more medical malpractice suits on insurance costs and
health care in Georgia is difficult to assess and predict, although parties
on both sides are willing to do so. Opponents of tort reform, including
the State Bar of Georgia, argue that "'tort reform' will not solve or
greatly affect the insurance premium crisis" in Georgia" and reference other states where caps did not impact the costs of malpractice
insurance premiums.'39 On the other hand, proponents of tort reform,
including MAG Mutual, argue that medical malpractice claims have
decreased since the 2005 tort reform effort and that insurance premiums
for Georgia physicians have not increased since 2005.140 Parties on
both sides of the tort reform debate offer various studies and statistics
in support of their positions. 41 However, these findings are unpersua-

136. No. 2007CV135208, 2008 WL 2068203 (Ga. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2008) (granting
motion to strike and entering declaratory judgment that O.C.G.A. § 51-13-1 (Supp. 2010)
is unconstitutional).
137. See id.
138. State Bar of Georgia Position Regarding Amending the Tort System in Georgia
(publication date uncertain) (copy on file with the Author).
139. State Bar of Georgia Position on Caps on Damages and Emergency Room
Immunity (publication date uncertain) (copy on file with the Author).
140. MAG Mutual, Tort Reform Update, THE MAGNET (Vol. 28, No. 1, 2010),
http://www.magmutual.com/mmicarticles/JanFeb_2010_GA-MAGnet.pdf.
141. Compare State Bar of Georgia Position on Caps on Damages and Emergency Room
Immunity, supra note 139 (discussing Weiss Ratings that show that states with caps on
noneconomic damages saw premiums increase), with MAG Mutual, supra note 140 (noting
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sive because, while all parties agree that the cost of healthcare is rising,
there is no empirical proof that this is caused by medical malpractice
lawsuits, as many variables affect health care costs.
By holding the caps unconstitutional based on the right to jury trial,
the court avoids the quagmire of conflicting statistics and competing
interests that it would have needed to consider and balance under an
equal protection or due process analysis. Unlike equal protection
analysis, as conducted in Park, a right to jury trial challenge does not
require the court to subject the caps to strict or mid-level scrutiny to
determine if the caps were necessary or legitimately related to reducing
health care costs and improving health care for Georgians. Thus, the
court was able to avoid the politics of tort reform and focus on the
individual citizen's rights.
B. Nationwide Effect
When addressing the constitutionality of noneconomic damage caps,
state courts are highly persuaded by holdings in other states. Georgia,
by becoming another state court holding noneconomic damage caps
unconstitutional in violation of the right to jury trial, adds further
weight to this position, and this could affect pending litigation across the
nation. There are signs that courts in other jurisdictions are taking
notice. One day after the Nestlehutt opinion was issued, Nestlehutt was
cited in a concurring opinion by the Missouri Supreme Court,142 noting
that the "inviolate" language in the Missouri Constitution"" is the
same as that of the Georgia Constitution" and stating in dicta that
the Missouri caps violate the right to jury trial.145
Further, by joining the Alabama Supreme Court, which also held
noneconomic damage caps unconstitutional," the outcome of Nestlehutt could have particular impact on other states in the Southeast. For
instance, a brief filed in May 2010 in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit challenged the constitutionality of noneconomic
damage caps in Florida on various grounds, one of which was the right

a University of Georgia study that found that 1000 more physicians practice in the state
than prior to the 2005 caps).
142. Klotz v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 771 (Mo. 2010) (Wolff J.,
concurring).
143. See Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22(a).
144. See GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. 11.
145. Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 780 (Wolff, J., concurring).
146. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 163 (Ala. 1992) (departing from
historical analysis but still holding noneconomic damage caps unconstitutional in violation
of right to jury trial).
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to jury trial."' The Nestlehutt opinion was cited as an example of a
"sister statell with similar constitutional protections and histories.""a
Whether this challenge will be effective is yet to be seen, but appellants
across the country will surely use Nestlehutt as another example of a
state that ruled noneconomic damage caps violate the right to jury trial.
Georgia Legislative Response
Because the Georgia Supreme Court expressly found that "[tihe very
existence of the caps, in any amount, is violative of the right to trial by
jury,"'4 9 the only way that the legislature could reapply the caps is to
amend the Georgia Constitution.150 A constitutional amendment
would require a two-thirds approval in the House and Senate, rather
than a simple majority, which many legislators concede is not likely. 1
While the amendment would be difficult, it is not impossible considering
the political power of the tort reform lobby.'"' The Georgia judiciary
has not been immune to political pressure by tort reform groups either.
In her 2006 re-election, Chief Justice Hunstein, author of the Nestlehutt
The
opinion, was challenged by a group of tort reform supporters.'
power of the tort reform lobby is evidenced nationally as well, with a
recent campaign to oust a chief'justice in Illinois after removing caps on
C.

malpractice liability."'4

Even if the Georgia Constitution is amended and the caps returned,
they would continue to be subject to constitutional challenges on the
grounds of equal protection and separation of powers-challenges that
were made by the appellee in this case but not addressed by the court
in its opinion.' Instead of amending the constitution, the legislature

147. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, McCall v. United States, No. 09-16375J (11th
Cir. 2010), 2010 WL 2648070.
148. Id. at 48.
149. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 736, 691 S.E.2d at 223.
150. Andy Peters, Legislators are Left with Few Options, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REPORT, Mar. 23, 2010, available at Westlaw FULTONDAILY.
151. Id.
152. See Aaron Gould Sheinin, Candidatesfor Governor Talk Health Care at Debate,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 28, 2010, http/www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections
/candidates-for-governor-talk-601632.html. Governor Nathan Deal-then-gubernatorial
candidate-stated, in response to this case, that if elected he would seek to further tort
reform and the damage caps by amending the state constitution. Id.
153. Alyson M. Palmer, Court Kills Caps on Med-malAwards, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REPORT, Mar. 23, 2010, availableat Westlaw FULTONDAILY.
154. A.G. Sulzberger, Voters Moving to Oust Judges Over Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 2010, http//www.nytimes.com/2010/09/25/us/politics/25judges.html.
155. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 738, 691 S.E.2d at 224.
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is more likely to continue advancing tort reform in other ways outside
of automatically triggered damage caps.
Although the future of tort reform in Georgia is uncertain, the
Nestlehutt opinion will undoubtedly have an impact on plaintiffs' medical
malpractice claims and may have an impact on plaintiffs' claims
nationwide. By ruling on the basis of a right to jury trial violation, the
court was able to avoid weighing in on the polarizing debate over the
cause of rising health care costs and focus on the individual citizens of
Georgia and their constitutional right to jury trial, making the competing interests and statistics on both sides of the debate a non-issue.
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